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shall be vegetarian, even vegan. In contraSt, conferences
occupied with topics in environmental ethics conunonly
display no such commitment; and as a matter of fact, I
fmd myself at these gatherings surrounded by persons
discoursing earnestly on the subtleties of biocentrism,
the land ethic, value· theory, deep ecology, Gaianism,
and so forth who are simultaneously tucking lustily into
steaks, chops, bacon, and even veal with no apparent
qualms. At one recent conference on environmental
ethics and sustainable development, of some fifty
participants. only two others besides myself had
requested vegetarian meals. At another, a workshop
on environmental ethics and higher education, I was
the only one of thirty participants not eating meat.
In case it may be thought that too much weight is
being placed here on one source of evidence, it should
also be noted that of seventeen general anthologies of
contemporary work in environmental ethics or
environmental philosophy that have appeared since
1974, only one contains an essay specifically devoted
to agricultural issues.1None contains an essay that treats
the topic of meat as an environmental problem. The
same omission is found in monographs in these fields.
(Ecofeminists, however, do engage this issue2 and
appear to be the only group of theorists for whom it is
anything like a central concern. What this entails will
be considered briefly in section 5.) What does it all
mean? Before I attempt an answer let me say that I fmd

1. A Dietary Approacb to Evaluating
Environmental Etbics

This essay begins at the intersection of two
controversies that are of considerable importance to
contemporary discussions about the relationship
between our species and the rest of nature. One concerns
the question of whether a compelling case can be made
for vegetarianism on moral grounds. The other has to
do with the debate between proponents ofanimal rights
and ethical holists over which kind of theory provides
a more adequate foundation for a new environmental
ethic. My remarks have their origin in some personal
observations as well. Over the past decade and a half I
have been a participant in numerous conferences,
seminars and workshops on themes having to do with
animal rights or animal liberation; I have also been
involved in many centering on problems in environ
mental ethics. These have all been positive experiences
for me in one way or another, and have, I believe,
expanded the horizons ofeveryone present. Yet I could
not avoid noticing that when I am at an animal rights or
animal liberation conference it is a foregone conclusion,
an essential premise, that all food presented to delegates
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the situation just described to be highly problematic
and anomalous. It took me a while to get a clear focus
on this discrepancy-which I suggest is not just between
two systems of thought (animal rights/animal liberation
theory and environmental holism), but between a form
of thought and actions that are incompatible with it.
Environmental ethicists are very sincere and dedicated
individuals, and a few are even political activists. Most
are reasonably well informed and committed to seeking
change in our dealings with the biosphere. But it would
appear that many also fail to see any inconsistency
between spearheading a search for a new ethic of the
environment and continuing to eat meat. Could it be
that this is only an appearance of inconsistency? Mter
all, it seems obvious that animal rights advocates or
animal liberationists would be acting in a radically
inconsistent fashion if they ate meat; but is it so clear
that environmental ethicists would likewise be? Many
of them would say it is not. arguing that their concern
is with the survival of species, the overall quality and
carrying capacity of vital ecosystems, wilderness
preservation, the aesthetic and other values embedded
in the biosphere, and similar holistic objects ofinterest.
They might add that humans, as naturally occurring
components of ecosystems, should feel free to eat
whatever they wish. From such a standpoint the fate of
individual animals, or even of large numbers ofanimals
purpose-bred for human consumption (which are
certainly not members of endangered species), matters
relatively little. However, I argue that this sort of
objection is ethically myopic and no more than self
serving; it is an example of the kind of compart
mentalized thinking that humans have practiced far too
long and from which environmental ethicists had
promised to deliver us. It is a kind of thinking that
must be abandoned if human and other forms of life
are to coexist and flourish on this planet.

old and which new, but which is the most
satisfactory (Frankena 1979: 4).
This seems a surprisingly liberal interpretation of the
Western ethical tradition. One can of course refuse to
regard an ethical theory as "at all complete" unless it
includes some reference to the environment; but this
would merely succeed in making Frankena's claim
circular and vacuous. Or one could vindicate his position
by observing that if a theory does not mention the
environment at all, we receive "guidance" from this very
fact in that none of our actions having a potentially
deleterious impact on the environment could be
proscribed by the theory, or the damage itself morally
condemned. This would count as an "implication" all
right; but then one might as well say that every ethical
theory is concerned with the full range of our actions,
of every conceivable kind, whether specified by it or
not. This, however, seems to yield a reductio ad
absurdum. While it may be acknowledged that whatever
is not morally prohibited is therefore morally
permissible, it would strike many as a travesty that an
ethical theory which is completely permissive with
respect to the natural world should, notwithstanding that
'fact, count as an environmental ethics. Indeed, one
would also wonder what all the controversy in this field
is about if it could be said that the ecological viewpoint
is so deeply embedded in our tradition as Frankena
might be held to suggest.
Aldo Leopold, on the other band, reflecting on the
same ethical tradition, wrote that the "single premise"
of all ethics is "that the individual is a member of a
community of interdependent parts" (Leopold 1970:
239). He suggests that ''Ethics are possibly a kind of
community instinct in-the-making" (Leopold 1970:
240).As the latter observation indicates, Leopold takes
an evolutionary or process view of the history of ethics.
That this is so can be illustrated by quoting him at
greater length:

2. Seeing Things Whole:
The Quest for an Ecological Ethic

This extension of ethics, so far studied only
by philosophers, is actually a process in
ecological evolution. Its sequences may be
described in ecological as well as in philo
sophical terms. An ethic, ecologically, is a
limitation on freedom of action in the struggle
for existence. An ethic, philosophically, is a
differentiation of social from anti-social
conduct. These are two definitions of one

William Frankena once wrote that:
every ethics that is at all complete is or includes
an ethics of the environment, since every such
ethics, new or old, tells us, at least indirectly,
what we may or may not, should or should
not do about plants, Jakes, minerals, etc.; and,
therefore, the main question is not which are
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deserve moral consideration and those that do not. Even
though the division that results looks different from the
old human/nonhuman dichotomy of traditional ethics,
there is a tendency to cling to hierarchical thinking.
Holistic theories of environmental ethics, by contrast,
overleap certain boundaries and seek to defme a more
ecologically informed position. Whether these
differences represent genuine incommensurabilities or,
rather, conceptual rifts that can be healed by some
rapprochement between views is of course a large issue
on which much effort has been expended (Regan 1982;
Taylor 1986; Stone 1987; Callicott 1989; Johnson 1991),
and I shall not take it up here. Whatl do wanttoobserve,
however, is that on the basis of this characterization, one
would expect environmental ethicists to be especially
sensitive to connections between issues that pertain to
our relationship with nature, particularly of course ethical
issues, and to take a cultural (even cross-cultural) and
global environmental perspective on such matters as
lifestyle and diet. This I find they often fail to do, and the
question is why. But before we seek an explanation of
this lack of insight, let us frrst examine the grounds for
connecting environmental concern with vegetarianism.

thing. The thing has its origin in the tendency
of interdependent individuals or groups to
evolve modes of cooperation. The ecologist
calls these symbioses. Politics and economics
are advanced symbioses in which the original
free-for-all competition has been replaced, in
part, by co-operative mechanisms with an
ethical content (Leopold 1970: 238)
Leopold's statement assumes a contractarian view I
should want to challenge: that humans are self-seeking
social atoms, whose mutually repelling tendencies need
to be suppressed and overridden by some institu
tionalized control mechanism. The error here, if it is
one, lies in overlooking or downplaying humans'
cooperative and caring instincts as well as the essentially
social constitution of personhood. In spite of these
reservations, however, Leopold's perspective on ethics
not only appears plausible and suggestive, but also
fruitful as a sort of heuristic principle for investigating
the history of ethics. Moreover, it is arguably truer to
what we observe of the changing preoccupations of
normative ethical theory, particularly over the past two
or three centuries. For much of this activity has been
concerned with rethinking the principles of ethics in
such a way that they can be extended and applied to
previously disenfranchised and marginalized persons
and other entities.
In what follows, therefore, I shall assume, for the
sake ofargument, thatFrankena was wrong and Leopold
was correct: in short, thoughtful reflection in the late
twentieth century on human activity and its impact upon
the planet, as well as on the remarkable properties and
capacities of other life-forms, entails that a new ethics
of the environment is both urgent and imperative; and
that such an ethical paradigm shift is both theoretically
and practically feasible. This assumption having been
made, we can now focus on the issue of environmental
ethics and vegetarianism.
Prior to considering why many environmental
ethicists still eat meat, I had become convinced that there
is an unbridgeable gulf between theories ofenvironmental
ethics and animal liberation and animal rights views. This
was because the former tend to be holistic and
communitarian and the latter individualistic and
aggregative in their conception of what constitutes the
good ofa collectivity. Animal liberation and animal rights
theories (and for that matter respect for life theories as
well) tend to fix boundaries between those entities that
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3. Making Connections:
The Case for Vegetarianism
There are of course many grounds that might be
adduced in support of choosing to be a vegetarian.
However, four seem to stand out:

1. a~suring good health for ourselves;
2. alleviating animal suffering and preventing
unnecessary animal deaths;
3. helping avoid environmental damage and
depletion; and
4. addressing the world hunger problem, which is
closely related to the problem ofsocial injustice.
With respect to good health unless one endorses a
doctrine of duties to oneself3 or has in mind one's
obligations to others, one's own state of well being is a
consideration of prudence, not of morality. In any event
the statistical correlation between high meat con
sumption and increased probability of colon, breast and
other cancers, heart disease and atherosclerosis-far and
away the leading causes of death in North America
has been well established by many independent
researchers (Robbins 1987; Barnard 1990; Fiddes
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system, one reasonably assumes, wguld be greater, and
therefore the system itself would be morally preferable.
Now most people apparently do not care very much,
if at all, about these issues. However, this lack of caring
may point to a self-serving, or self-protective blind spot
in people's moral consciousness. For as Bentham
pointed out long ago, and many others since have
reaffumed, animal suffering should concern us because
all forms of suffering should concern us--{)r at the very
least suffering that is comparable in kind and degree to
what we are familiar with at first hand. And a diet that
depends on massive mechanized carnage should at least
give us pause to consider what we are doing to satisfy
our palates. As Carol J. Adams has argued, "Meat eating
is the most oppressive and extensive institutionalized
violence against animals" (Adams 1991: 70). So even
if we don't subscribe to the very strong view that "Meat
is murder," we should still be appalled at the magnitude
of the death-dealing we acquiesce in by being meat
eaters: in excess of five billion sentient beings are
slaughtered annually in the United States alone (Singer
1990: 95). If figures like these leave one indifferent, it
would appear that a certain moral numbness has set in,
which ought in itself to signal the need for some serious
self-reflection. It is difficult to avoid drawing the
conclusion that we must each face up to the fact that
our choices as consumers materially affect the amount
of animal suffering and death. We either opt in or we
opt out of the animal agony system. If we do not think
too carefully or too critically about our diets, we can
easily overlook the consequences they have; but this is
also a choice, namely, a choice of omission. We are no
less responsible for it than for any other choice. And if
we are informed about the misery created by factory
farming and related activities, yet still knowingly elect
to eat meat, we are even more culpable.
An alternative way of understanding this form of
neglect is that it springs from our culturally conditioned
perception of our food and how as individuals we
choose, more or less consciously, to affum it in our
daily lives. That is, each of ns sees animal flesh in a
mat'ket or present before us cooked upon a plate as either
"meat" (or some "cut" thereof) or as body parts of a
once living, now dead animal, perhaps even related to
us as a natural kin. It is obvious that the former way of
seeing tends to evoke thoughts and feelings ofpleasure,
comfort, hunger, nourishment, well-being, and the like,
while the latter may be accompanied by thoughts and
feelings of horror, disgust, displeasure, uneasiness,

1991 ). There is no doubt that a vegetarian diet is better
for one's health. And if one wishes to argue that
maintaining good health is a moral obligation and not
merely a matter of prudence-a duty to oneself or to
others, such as one's family-then there are even more
compelling reasons to be a vegetarian for health reasons.
The second argument concerns the reduction and/
or elimination of animal suffering and death, both of
which are products in abundance of the agribusiness
industry and in particular of modem intensive livestock
rearing methods or "factory farming." This suffering
and death has been widely documented by various
observers and writers (Mason and Singer 1980; Singer
1990). For some suffering is the central or only issue;
utilitarians typically regard animals as fully replaceable,
and for them the special wrongfulness of factory
farming consists in the brutal procedures characteristic
of that activity: forced, life-long confinement in artificial
and barren environments, forced impregnation,
debeaking, separation of veal calves and piglets from
their mothers in early infancy, crowded caging, social
deprivation, suppression ofgrooming and other species
specific behaviors, and cruel transportation, holding and
slaughtering methods.lf the pain and suffering inherent
in these practices could be eliminated, then for those
whose sole preoccupation is with such things, no ethical
issue would remain. Painless, instantaneous slaughter
following a reasonably decent, if short, domesticated
life would be an acceptable outcome. For others, who
see animals as irreplaceable individuals or "subjects of
a life" in Tom Regan's sense (Regan 1983: 243), this is
unacceptable because such individuals are bearers of
rights, preeminent among these being the right to life.
It is not my purpose here to try to settle this dispute
but, rather, to indicate that the problem of vast amounts
of suffering contingent upon current livestock rearing
and marketing practices is a real one that we cannot
ignore, no matter what our philosophical persuasion.
Some may subscribe to the view that animal suffering
and death in colossal quantities does not matter morally,
or that if it does matter, its ethical import is offset or
neutralized by the human enjoyment of animal products
and the various forms of economic gain generated by
satisfaction of human wants that are dependent upon
using animals for food. However, human enjoyment in
eating meat and economic gains accruing to the meat,
egg and dairy industries could be realized in a vegetarian
economy just as well. And because far less suffering
would be generated, the overall utility of the latter
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net exporters offood to the more affluent countries (this,
apparently, remains the case today); that ruminants could
graze entirely on marginal rather than prime agricultural
lands because they efficiently produce protein from
cellulose; and that the North American food production
system basically feeds animals, not people. The latter
finding has received confirmation recently from Alan
Durning, senior researcher at the Worldwatch Institute,
who contends that nearly forty percent of the world's
grain and seventy percent of American grain are fed to
livestock (Durning 1991). Meanwhile Oxfam estimates
that 14.6 million. hectares of often choice land in
developing nations is dedicated to producing animal feedS
for European livestock (Gold 1991). Michael Redclift
places the figure much higher, at 21.6 million heetares
(Redclift 1987: 93). According to another report,
"Worldwide over one-third of all grain is grown to feed
livestock, whilst at least 500 million people are
malnourished" (Fiddes 1991: 211). An estimated sixty
gallons ofwater are needed to produce a pound of wheat,
but a pound ofmeat requires 2500 gallons (Fiddes 1991:
215). These are scarcely rational uses of abundant but
ever more precious planetary resources.
The average North American is overfed and
overproteinized; this is too well known to be debatable
any longer. According to David Pimenael, who has been
studying the environmental impact of modem
agriculture for more than a decade, per capita daily
consumption ofprotein in the United States is 102 grams
(70 of which is of animal origin), while the United
Nations Food and Agricultural Organization's recom
mended level is 41 grams (Pimentel 1990). As Robbins
points out, people in the developing world "are copying
us. They associate meat eating with the economic status
of the developed nations and strive to emulate it. The
tiny minority who can afford meat in those countries
eats it, even while many of their people go to bed hungry
at night, and mothers watch their children starve"
{Robbins 1987: 351). He estimates that"agiven acreage
can feed twenty times as many people eating a pure
vegetarian [or vegan] diet-style as it could people eating
the standard American diet-style." The same acreage
would feed between six and seven lacto-ovo vegetarians
(Robbins 1987: 352). Meanwhile, Lester Brown of the
Overseas Development Council calculates that a mere
ten percent reduction in American meat eating would
free up enough grain to feed all of the sixty million
humans who starve to death annually (Brown, cited in
Robbins 1987: 352). Robbins concludes that "Hunger

perhaps even guilt. The basis for either set of reactions
is not "purely subjective": both are grounded in
meaningful interactions with the world and shared
attitudes toward it. The main point is simply that ethical
responses here, as elsewhere, are contingent on how
we (choose to) see the world and relevant items in it. If
there is a significant sense in which we choose how we
perceive animal flesh offered for food, or at any rate
ought to become aware of how we perceive it and why,
then it follows again that we are responsible for our
actions that proceed from our way of seeing.
The third ground for vegetarianism mentioned
earlier has to do with the environmental impact ofmeat
production. The ceo-destructive consequences of the
meat industry's operations have been summarized
concisely, with ample documentation from both
governmental and non-governmental sources, by John
Robbins in Diet for a New America (Robbins 1987).
These include: toxic chemical residues in the food chain,
pharmaceutical additives in feeds, polluting chemicals
and animal wastes from feedlot runoff in waterways
and underground aquifers, topsoil loss caused by
patterns of relentless grazing, domestic and foreign
deforestation and desertification owing to the clearing
of land for grazing and for cultivating livestock feed,
threatened habitats of wild species ofplants and animals,
intensive exploitation of water and energy supplies, and
fmally ozone depletion owing to the extensive use of
fossil fuels and to significant production of methane
gas by cattle. Even without citing supporting facts and
figures, this litany of ecological woes surely ought to
concern even the most undaunted environmental
ethicist. That it apparently does not exercise many-at
least a.<; revealed by their writings and personal dietarY
habits-calls for explanation.
Fourth is the ca.<;e for vegetarianism drawn from the
world food erisis. Over twenty years ago in her book
Dietfor a Small Planet, Frances Moore Lap¢ deseribed
the wa.'iteful feedlot process of rearing cattle for beef as
"a protein factory in reverse" (sixteen units of protein
input for each one of output [Lap¢ 1975: 11]; other
estimates place the ratio as high as twenty to one, and
the ratio of caloric input to caloric output for human
consumption at ten to one [Fiddes 1991]). She also
reported her "discovery that in 1968 the amount of
humanly edible protein fed to American livestock and
not returned for human consumption approached the
whole world's protein deficit!" (Lappe 1975: 3). Lap¢
pointed out that the poor countries of the world are often
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effects of our present actions in the realm of
agriculture for another twenty or thirty years.
In the interim, things will merely become
slightly less pleasant, year after year. To
continue to maintain a meat economy can only
make matters increasingly difficult for
everyone, and can only adversely affect the
goals of health for everyone and world peace
(Akers 1983: 140).

is really a social disease caused by the unjust, inefficient
and wasteful control of food" ( Robbins 1987: 353).
Exploitation is clearly a principal feature of this
"disease," as the poorest countries of the world fmd
their traditional agricultural practices and diets
increasingly undermined, their peoples increasingly
undernourished, their lands deforested for grazing, their
position in international markets undermined, and other
negative effects of the international meat economy
controlled by multinational corporations visited upon
them (Redclift 1987~ Gold 1991; Fiddes 1991).
Production, distribution and control of the market
are the complex, dynamic elements that reinforce and
perpetuate these forms ofexploitation. Their scope goes
beyond what we have space for here. Suffice it to say,
however, that everyone bas a clear choice between
abetting the conditions which enable the "social disease"
of world hunger to flourish and saying ''no" by means
of her or his own dietary commitments. Most environ
mental ethicists have not dissented in this manner
just as they have failed to discuss the impact of the
international meat economy on the environment-and
again this calls for explanation.
The third and fourth grounds for vegetarianism
illustrate, when considered together, just the sort of
connection environmental thinkers should be making.
For when unsustainable meat production takes its toll
on the environment and consumes an inordinate share
of the earth's resources, everyone is impoverished,
especially those who are already short of food. These
cumulative effects of the preferred North American diet
are concisely summarized by Keith Akers at the
conclusion of a very detailed discussion of what he
labels "vegetarian ecology":

If it is true that "Meat production is a major source
ofenvironmental damage" (Bloyd-Peshikin 1991: 67),
why don't environmental ethicists oppose it in every
way they can? Why don't they uniformly take a stand
in favor of vegetarianism, not only by advocating it in
their writings, teachings and presentations at confer
ences but also by adopting it as a personal dietary
commitment? Why aren't they voting with their forks?
The generous interpretation would be that they do not
see the connections between environmentalism and
vegetarianism and between meat eating and environ
mental destruction, or at any rate that they do not see
them very clearly or appreciate their force. If, however,
they do see the connections, these are not as a rule
acknowledged or acted upon, which would appear to
indicate a lack of caring and even a form of ethical
negligence. To unravel what's going on here, we need
a deeper explanation.

In the long run, we are all going to be
vegetarians. Doubtless through further
exploitation of the environment, we can
prolong the period in our history in which we
think it necessary to kill animals for food. But
the ecological limitations ofthis procedure will
soon make manifest to all that a vegetarian
economy is both necessary and desirable.
Only a small minority of the world's citizens
will ever be able to consume meat at current
American levels: the resources to support a
more intensive livestock agriculture simply
don't exist. We will probably not feel the real
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4. On Not Making Connections:
Why Environmental Ethicists Still Eat Meat

1991: 13); and bearing the weight of sustaining the
masculinized myth of Homo Sapiens as a preeminently
hunting species. Meat is the quintessential symbol of
our species' domination of nature, our capacity to
transform life into death, to conquer and exploit what
is other, what is at our mercy. Meat is also a highly
visible symbol, reminder and reinforcer of patriarchal
control in all of its manifestations. Meat is masculine
food, powerful food; to be a "real man" is to eat meat
lots of it, and the redder the better. And to be a "real
man" is to be what our society holds up as the most
valid and valuable kind of human being. We may fancy
that we aren't so simple-minded or biased as to be gulled
by such crude associations of ideas and emotions. But
in a culture like ours, it is difficult to be sure. Without
engaging in a lengthy process of critical self
examination, no one can be completely confident of
immunity from influences of this sort.
Fiddes reminds us too that "Children have
traditionally been brought up to regard consuming the
flesh of other animals as both normal and desirable."
It is therefore not surprising that "Meat eating is... a
principle unquestioned by most people" (Fiddes 1991:
5). Furthermore, the ideas symbolically associated
with meat eating "need seldom, if ever, be directly
thought in order to be significantly influential. They
can operate at a level of cultural consensus ratller tllan
individual awareness, and may be all the more
powerful for that" (Fiddes 1991: 229). For such
associations and meanings readily nourish the
weakness of will, self-deception and rationalization
that block moral decision-making.
What happens when this complex mental set is
confronted and brought into question? As part of the
structure of humans' power over nature, meat eating is
a political act. And to take issue with this practice is
therefore a subversive act. Fiddes writes:

We have seen above that what we eat is not a matter
of subjective preference alone. Serious moral issues are
involved in making this choice, and environmentally
conscious and conscientious persons generally ought
to inform themselves about these and to become
vegetarians in consequence. It's as simple as that. But
even self-avowed holistic environmental philosophers
often fail to see the connections or else ignore, bury or
rationalize them. My hypothesis is that their inability
or unwillingness to make ethical connections between
environmental concern and a vegetarian diet is
motivated by the same factors that influence members
of the general population who remain wedded to
carnivorous eating habit.'>, the principal difference being
that environmental ethicists have more subtle,
intellectualized ways of legitimating their choice.
To understand the dynamics of this process we must
first come to terms with the meaning of meat.
Anthropologist Nick Fiddes argues that meat and meat
eating possess profound cultural significance and that
the institutions surrounding them affmn t11e ideology
governing our relationship to nature. Fiddes writes:
Meat is flesh of what were once living
animals; it is destined for our physical
consumption. This makes it an exceptionally
well suited exemplification of our ability to
control and vanquish the non-human world
a goal ... upon which we have ...placed great
emphasis (Fiddes 1991: 173).
Belief in human dominion does not merely
legitimate meat eating-the reverse is also true:
meat reinforces that presumption. Killing,
cooking, and eating other animals' flesh
provides perhaps the ultimate authentication
of human superiority over the rest of nature,
with the spilling of their blood a vibrant motif
(Fiddes 1991: 65).

To dispute that the individual bas unlimited
rights over animals is to defy an almost sacred
tenet of our common ideology-it is to imply
that the power of human culture over nature is
limited, and that is indeed controversial in a
soeiety in which human supremacy has for so
long been a c.entral ethos (Fiddcs 1991; 64).

In accordance with this symbolic link, meat has been
invested, in our own and other cultures, with a number
of interesting properties, among which are: association
with strength and aggression; high social value and the
capacity to confer status; being equated with "the very
idea of food itself' (Twigg 1983: 21; cited in Fiddes
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It follows that considerable resistance can be expected
to meet any such challenge, with corresponding attempts
to undermine, discredit, marginalize, ridicule, silence,
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I shall look briefly at but one aspect of this process:
their ethical rationalizations.
The anthropocentric, dominionist, patriarchal
ideology that undergirds meat eating and modern
livestock producing practices surfaces in a somewhat
disguised but still quite apparent form in the writings
of some of today's leading environmental ethicists.
J. Baird Callicott, for example-probably the most
ardent and prolific exponent of the land ethic-explains
Leopold's dedication to hunting and lack of concern
over eating meat and over the abysmal treatment of
domesticated animals as the products of a "different
theoretical foundation," "cosmic vision" or "substratum
of thought and value" from those shared by animal
liberationists (Callicott 1989: 17, 18). According to his
account Leopold's land ethic is not to be viewed as
inconsistent with these acts and attitudes. However this
strikes me as merely designed to neutralize an
embarrassing lack of ability to make connections at the
heart of the theory which in other respects endeavors
to forge and render them visible to us.4
Callicott, for his own part, has claimed (allegedly
in the spirit of the land ethic) that universal vegetar
ianism would swell the earth's human population
because of the greater availability (in principle) of food
supplies, and "is therefore probably ecologically
catastrophic" (Callicott 1989: 35). This concern would
scarcely seem primary in a world of mass starvation
whose population grows exponentially, the prevalence
of meat eating notwithstanding. Critics of moral
vegetarian arguments typically assume, to their obvious
advantage, a scenario in which world food production
changes completely overnight and a universal
vegetarian economy springs into existence from
nowhere (e.g. Frey 1983: Chap. 17). This of course is
an absurdity which no thoughtful visionary would
entertain seriously. Many questions remain: what a
global approach to sustainable agriculture might look
like; whether free-ranging livestock could support the
world's present and future demand for meat and other
animal food products; whether decreased consumption
of these foodstuffs might be an ethically attractive
option to vegetarianism; whether even a major, gradual
shift to vegetarianism is likely to contribute directly to
the relief of world hunger; and whether (and to what
extent) the richer nations of the world are morally
obligated to feed the poorer ones. But these should not
deter us from conducting an ethical enquiry into the
connections between what we eat and its consequences.

and intimidate those who have breached the assumed
common ideology of nature domination. Strong
economic vested interests will also predictably reinforce
these responses. Such a backlash is readily observable
and well documented (Adams 1991; Fiddes 1991). An
instructive example is provided by the case ofCanadian
country music star k.d. lang, who, because ofher public
stand against meat eating, has recently been declared
"anti-agriculture" by an official of the province of
Alberta and has had to cancel concerts for fear of
inciting hostile redneck mob behavior. Her avowed
lesbianism has also been used, by association, to
discredit her message. In short, interrogating the
culturally prevalent practice of meat eating poses a
threat to the accepted notion of human supremacy over
nature and, consequently, stirs up potent counterforces.
It can be dangerous to your health to go against the
grain in this manner.
There is bound to be considerable personal
resistance to changing dietary habits as well, since for
each of us these have become enmeshed in a complex
network of meanings surrounding cultural practices,
rituals, expressions of friendship, modes of self
recognition, even sexual self-identification (Adams
1991). Sharon Bloyd-Peshkin observes that:
diet is one of the most personal of habits.
People have a long-standing and deep
emotional attachment to the foods they eat.
What a person ate as a child will always spell
comfort, and for many people, the foods they
eat express the culture they come from or the
class [one could add: race and sex] they belong
to.... In addition, people who change their
diets find their relationships with their
colleagues, family and friends affected....
Other habits don't carry this emotional
weight.... Giving up the foods you were raised
on is a very large sacrifice-if you can do it at
all (Bloyd-Peshkin 1991: 70).
Obstacles to be overcome in changing to a vegetarian
diet, then, are not only cultural-political but also
cultural-personal and tied up with socialization and
intimate habits that shape our self-identities. These can
be a powerful deterrent to change. One might expect
all of these elements to play as great a part in
determining the outlook ofenvironmental ethicists who
still eat meat and even defend their doing so. However,
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This is an interesting observation from one who
has asserted only a page earlier that "Domestic animals
are breeds, no longer natural kinds" (Rolston 1988:
78). Also worthy of note is Rolston's appeal to the
cherished view that when humans eat meat they are
merely acting "naturally" or "instinctually," just as
other predators do in the wild. What we see here,
however, is but another example of a common
speciesist ploy: humans, claiming themselves to be
superior to other species (not least because of their
capacity for ethics), justify their behavior as
"following nature" when it suits them to do so and
conveniently shield themselves from comparisons with
other species when that is more advantageous. Not
only this, but the assumption is being made, as it
frequently is in such arguments, that humans are
natural omnivores who have defined their culture
through hunting, etc., even though there is much
evidence to the contrary (Fiddes 1991).
Humans, then, Rolston maintains, have no duty not
to eat sentient animals because they would do so in a
state of nature. To think otherwise is to confuse human
ethics with environmental ethics, or to "see ourselves
in fur" (Rolston 1988: 80). Why is it an error to "see
ourselves in fur'' when it comes to the question ofeating
animals? Because animals suffer less than humans;
"they do not suffer the affliction .. . that humans would
if bred to be eaten." This argument seems merely
bizarre: humans may eat animals because they are
capable of greater suffering tban animals. (An
additionally confounding claim is made a few pages
later, where Rolston asserts that food animals suffer only
"instrumental pain, so designated because it serves a
higher good. "Instrumental pain" is not as bad as
"intrinsic pain," which is "a bad thing, absolutely"
[Rolston 1988: 82]. This might be an interesting point
for someone, somewhere, to ponder who is being
tortured "for the good of the state!").
But there is more involved here than considerations
about pain and suffering. Rolston claims that the "value
destruction" involved in the killing ofbumans for food
would be greater than in the killing ofanimals for food.
Leaving aside the puzzling eccentricity of tying this
whole discussion to the consequences of cannibalism,
a reasonable reply is that if we are seriously going to
worry about value destruction, it seems plain that less
of it will be caused by eating plants and plant products
than by eating animals, and so we ought accordingly to
choose this less destructive course of action.

Callicott argues further that "'The important thing ...is
not to eat vegetables as opposed to animal flesh, but to
resist factory farming" of both animals and plants. He
draws support for this statement from the observation
that "The land ethic ...helps us to recognize and afftrm
the organic integrity ofself and the untenability ofa frrm
distinction between self and environment" (Callicott
1989: 36). Unfortunately this reasoning completely
sidesteps the problem of animal suffering and death in
the service of humans' dietary preferences. This, one
would suppose, might trouble the conscience of a self
dedicated to its own integrity and to experiencing
connectedness with all forms of life.
A similarly blinkered but more transparently
anthropocentric view can be found in the work of
Holmes Rolston III, another prominent environmental
ethicist Rolston begins a discussion of domestic food
animals by declaring that "Animal agriculture is
tangential to an environmental ethic," though he allows
that there is some weak connection between them
(Rolston 1988: 78). Why does he say this? Because
"Although food animals are taken out of nature and
transformed by culture, they remain uncultured in their
sentient life, cultural objects that cannot become
cultural subjects." What follows from this? Rolston
reasons that:
They ought to be treated... with no more
suffering than might have been their lot in the
wild, on average, adjusting for their modifted
capacities to care for themselves ... [D]omestic
animals ought to be spared pointless suffering
but they have no claim to be spared innocent
suffering (Rolston 1988: 79).
How does the "failure" on the part of animals to
resemble their "cultured" captors and masters lend
support to these startling and breathtakingly dogmatic
non sequiturs? We return again to Rolston's text
The killing and the eating of animals, when
they occur in culture, are still events in
nature; they are ecological events, no matter
how superimposed by culture .... Humans
eat meat, and meat-eating is a natural
component of ecosystems, one to which we
do not object in nature nor try to eliminate
from our cultural interactions with nature
(Rolston 1988; 79-80).
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unfortunate and, as I hope I have shown, also mistaken
to infer from the limitations of animal rights/animal
liberation theories and the absence of an adequate
rapprochement between these and environmental
holism that vegetarianism is not ethically obligatory.
Nor is there any justification in today's world for the
attitude of leading environmental activists who
reportedly trivialize dietary choice by labeling it a
"personal and lifestyle issue" (Bloyd-Peshkin 1991: 68).
As long as environmental ethicists continue to ignore
the issue of vegetarianism, it will be difficult to take
seriously their claims to be the proponents of a new
holistic ethic. Indeed, when we examine vegetarianism
as a test case, it appears that those in the animal rights/
animal liberation movement exhibit, by means of their
personal choices and organizational policies, a deeper
commitment to a holistic outlook on nature. One animal
activist makes this clear by succinctly stating:

5. Conclusion

It has been shown that meat eating not only causes
much suffering and death to sentient nonhuman animals,
but also is inseparable from activities that are ecologically
damaging and environmentally unsustainable. These
activities, in addition, are antithetical to the aims ofsocial
justice and equality, which are part of the wider meaning
of sustainability. For meat eating is bound up with the
oppression and exploitation of others elsewhere in the
world who have less than we do of the basic necessities
of life-in large measure because we have more than we
need. Meat eating therefore contributes materially to the
process whereby the poorer citizens of the world have
their interest in a better life denied, while at the same
time it promotes the identical interest of the more affluent
I have argued that many environmental ethicists
even those claiming to be ethical holists--do not make
connections that ought to be made between large-scale
ethical issues which should concern us all. These issues
make vegetarianism a moral imperative. Animal
liberation theories stress sentience in their critique of
the meat industry and judge that the suffering it causes
to nonhuman animals makes meat eating immoral.
Animal rights theories place emphasis on the possession
of interests and rights by nonhuman animals and fmd
herein the moral basis for opposing meat eating. One
might expect that an ethical outlook which purports to
be more overarching than these would bring the sorts
ofconnectious discussed earlier into even sharper focus.
However environmental ethicists who omit or refuse
to change their dietary habits reveal a commitment to
holism that is more abstract, notional and inconsistent
than it is substantive and of practical significance.
According to one analysis, many environmentalists
do not choose to become vegetarians because they
identify vegetarianism with animal rights advocacy, and
this in tum with principles and policies that stand in
opposition to projects that concern them most, such as
wildlife management, environmental research, feral
population control, and culling of "overpopulated"
species (Bloyd-Peshkin 1991). It may be that environ
mental ethicists share these concerns, and that this is
part of their motivation as well. There are undoubtedly
major difficulties to be encountered in addressing these
sorts of environmental issues from the standpoint of
animal rights or animal liberation theories, and it has
not been demonstrated yet whether or how these
problems can be worked out. However, it would be
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Animals are part of the environment, they are
endangered species, they are being used in
exploitative ways that are bad for the envi
ronment And certainly, along with us, they
will be victims in any nuclear holocaust. All
those things make the connections between the
overall environmental and antinuclear move
ments pretty obvious. The ones that are not so
obvious, but where I think we must make the
liaison, is with the consciousness about racism
and the woman's movement and the gay
movement (Sally Gearhart, cited in Sperling
1988: 101).
A closer dialogue with these individuals might therefore
serve environmental ethicists well. It might, by the same
token, win their voices greater credibility.
But more requires to be done as well. Environmental
ethics must move in the direction indicated by
ecofeminist theory in some of its more recent
manifestations. Lori Gruen (Gruen 1993: 80, 84)
explains that:
Ecofeminists must. .. attempt to establish a
different system of values in which the
normative category of "other" (animals,
people of color, "Third World" people, the
lower classes, etc.) is reevaluated. By
recognizing that the exploitation that occurs
as a result of establishing power over one
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seek to attain the optimum state of species well-being that is
appropriate to being fully human.

group is unlikely to be confined to that group
only, ecofeminists are committed to a
reexamination and rejection of all forms of
domination.... Making connections, between
the various ways in which oppression operates
and between those individuals who suffer such
oppression, will allow all beings to live
healthier, more fulfilling, and freer lives.

4 This point would remain no less forceful even if (a big if)
we were to concede the often-voiced arguments that (a) hunters
are exemplary nature lovers and conservationists, and (b) it's
better to kill your own meat than to have someone else do the
dirty work for you. For whatever the merits of these arguments,
they somehow distract our attention from the principal issue,
which is whether one's individual choices and decisions support
a grossly inhumane and wasteful mechanized system of
generating animal products for human consumption.

What this form of analysis helps us see is that
consistency in theorizing, and between theory and
practice, is not just a purely "rational" value that
philosophers cherish and that everyone should aim to
realize; it is also a matter of seeing connections between
what we believe, espouse and do, and that this in turn
can lead us to a better understanding of what it means
to minimize the harm that we cause by our choices and
to live more lightly on the planet 5

5 Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the
"Ethics, Animals and Society" conference held at the
University of Guelph, Guelph, Ontario, Canada, 20-22 March
1992, and at the Queen's University Philosophy Colloquium,
18 February 1993. I would like to acknowledge, with
appreciation, comments on these earlier drafts by Eugene
Hargrove, Sue Hendler, Bill Holder,· Wayne Ouderkirk,
Christine Overall and Richard A. Watson.
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